Combinatorial Inflation: Resolving The Intrinsic Nature Problem In Panpsychism.
1.1 Solution To Intrinsic Nature Problem
The following argument makes the case for a solution to the Intrinsic Nature Problem in physics. The case made here is that physics – while being a valuable and successful tool – for telling us about the physical dimensions of reality, it is not a tool that can tell us about the intrinsic nature of matter (Goff, 2019; Eddington, 2019). Thus, through logical deduction, it shall be argued that the sole window into the nature of matter that we have, is that of consciousness (Eddington, 2019).
One of the strongest arguments supporting panpsychism is the Intrinsic Matter Argument, articulated by philosophers like Russell and Eddington (Jylkkä, 2016; Goff, 2019). Physics, while immensely successful in describing the relationships between physical properties like mass, charge, and force, tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature of these properties (Eddington, 2019; Jylkkä, 2016; Goff, 2019). Physics is primarily a tool for prediction, using equations to describe behaviors and interactions without addressing what these properties are in themselves (Eddington, 2019; Jarocki, 2024). Eddington highlights that physics provides "pointer readings" - measurable outcomes observed through instruments - but offers no insight into the fundamental nature of matter itself (Eddington, 2019; Goff, 2019). For example, while physics can describe the behavior of mass and force, such as in Newton’s law of gravity, it cannot explain what mass or force intrinsically are (Hubert, 2021; Jaki, 2018; Goff, 2019). According to Jaki, 2018, the defining feature of all material things is that they possess extension, which gives rise to measurable quantitative properties. While these properties allow us to observe and describe material things, they do not explain their essence or nature (Jaki, 2018). The mere presence of quantitative properties cannot answer the fundamental question, “what is it?” — they describe but do not define the essence of a thing (Jaki, 2018). Therefore, the authority of science is limited to the realm of the measurable. When a proposition involves terms that cannot be reduced to measurable properties, science loses its explanatory power (Jaki, 2018).
Consider an electron’s properties - such as mass and charge – which are defined in terms of their behaviors: mass involves gravitational attraction and resistance to acceleration, while charge describes interactions with other charges (Goff, 2019). These descriptions focus exclusively on relationships and interactions, leaving the intrinsic nature of the electron unexplained (Eddington, 2019). Another example can be given to simplistic explain this point. Consider a chess piece. Knowing how a bishop moves tells us what it does on the board, but not what it is - whether it is made of wood or plastic (Goff, Seager, and Hermanson, 2001). Thus, there must be more to an electron than its external behaviors, an intrinsic reality that physics does not address (Eddington, 1920; Goff, 2019). Therefore, this limitation indicates that while physics is a powerful predictive tool, it cannot explain the true nature of matter (Goff, 2019; Eddington, 2019; Jarocki, 2024; Jaki, 2018).
Therefore, we have established that science is limited to describing the quantitative aspects of reality. It can measure properties like size and position, but it cannot reveal the intrinsic nature of matter or explain what matter fundamentally is. Science describes how matter behaves, but not what it is. However, this gap in the scientific worldview presents an opportunity for a parsimonious solution - one that addresses this explanatory gap in a coherent and elegant way. The solution to this gap is presented as followed. As human beings, we do have a small window into the intrinsic nature of matter: the consciousness we directly experience in our own brains (Goff, 2019; Eddington, 2019). While physics provides "pointer readings" (measurements of external properties), the subjective reality of consciousness reveals something about the intrinsic nature of the matter within us (Eddington, 2019). While physics cannot reveal the intrinsic nature of matter, human beings have a unique insight into it through our own brains, which generate the subjective experience of consciousness (Eddington, 2019).
Centrally, the reason why this proposal gains credibility is because there appears to be no alternative candidate for the intrinsic nature of matter (Eddington, 1920). Physical science remains silent on what matter is beyond its behaviors (Eddington, 1933). If observation fails to provide clues, we are left with two options: the panpsychist view, where matter’s intrinsic nature is rooted in consciousness, or Locke’s idea that matter is an unknowable “we know not what.” From this, panpsychism, offers a unified picture of reality, emerging as the more coherent and explanatory framework (Eddington, 1933).
The argument can be summarised as follows: physics does not provide insight into the intrinsic nature of matter. The only window we have into the intrinsic nature of matter is through access to our minds – which reveals consciousness. Therefore, it follows that the intrinsic nature of matter is best understood as consciousness.
1.2 Causal Structuralism:
Although this argument may initially seem convincing, many critics argue that it is fundamentally flawed. It is contended that the concept of "intrinsic nature of matter" is misleading and inherently problematic (Hawthorne, 2001). Instead, it is proposed that there is no intrinsic nature of matter; rather, reality is defined solely by the relationships between things (Sepetyi, 2023; Hawthorne, 2001; Schneider, 2017). Consequently, if intrinsic matter does not exist, the idea that human experience provides a unique insight into matter - and that this perspective can be extended to all matter - is fundamentally flawed.
As noted above, a key argument for panpsychism is the Intrinsic Nature Argument, which claims that physics describes only the behavior of matter, not its intrinsic nature (Goff, 2019). Since no alternative explanation for the intrinsic nature of matter exists, panpsychism asserts that our only direct insight into matter’s true nature comes from conscious experience. Therefore, the intrinsic nature of matter is consciousness (Eddington, 1933).
Yet, an argument against the notion of intrinsic nature is posited by causal structuralism, a branch of thought which asserts that there is nothing more to the nature of a physical entity, such as an electron, than how it is disposed to behave (Eagle, 2009; Sepetyi, 2023; Hawthorne, 2001). Thus, if you understand what an electron does, you then know everything that there is to know about its nature (Sepetyi, 2023; Hawthorne, 2001). On this view of causal structuralism, things are not so much beings as doings (Alter and Pereboom, 2023; Saatsi, 2017). If one assumes causal structuralism, it becomes possible that the models of physics can completely characterise the nature of physical entities; a mathematical model can capture what an electron does, and in doing so will tell us what the electron is (Hawthorne, 2001; Alter and Pereboom , 2023). This is because causal structuralism asserts that there is nothing more to the nature of a physical entity than how it is disposed to behave, rather than any intrinsic nature (Hawthorne, 2001; Saatsi, 2017; Eagle, 2009).
In order for the intrinsic nature argument of panpsychism to hold, it must be able to adequately defend from the causal structuralists, who assert that the notion of intrinsic nature of matter is wrong. Presented henceforth shall be an array of arguments against causal structuralism, aiming to reaffirm the notion of an intrinsic nature of matter.
One of the central arguments against causal structuralism is the issue that causal structuralists attempt to characterise the nature of matter as merely beings, rather than things, lead either to a vicious regress or a vicious circle (Goff, 2019). According to causal structuralists, we understand the nature of a disposition only when we know the behaviour to which it gives rise when it is manifested (Hawthorne, 2001; Eagle, 2009). For example, the manifestation of flammability is burning; we only know what flammability is when we know that it’s manifested through burning (Goff, 2019). However, assuming causal structuralism, the manifestation of any disposition – how it behaves under certain conditions - will be another disposition, and the manifestation of that disposition will be another disposition, and so on ad infinitum (Goff, 2019; Eagle, 2009; Azzano, 2023). The buck is continually passed, and hence an understanding of the nature of any property is impossible (Goff, 2019). In other words, a causal structuralist world is unintelligible (Goff, 2019; Azzano, 2023). Therefore – if the causal structuralist are correct – then the world is unintelligible, insofar as every property is defined by another property, creating an infinite regress with no foundational explanation (Goff, 2017).
This point can be expressed best through an example. According to general relativity, mass and spacetime stand in a relationship of mutual causal interaction: mass curves spacetime, and the curvature of spacetime in turn affects the behaviour of objects with mass (as matter tends, all things being equal, to follow geodesics though spacetime) (Hobson, Efstathiou and Lasenby, 2006; Wüthrich and Huggett, 2020). What is mass? For a causal structuralist, we know what mass is when we know what it does, i.e. when we know the way in which it curves spacetime (Ryder, 2009; Goff, 2017). But to really understand what this amounts to metaphysically, as opposed to being able merely to make accurate predictions, we need to know what spacetime curvature is (Goff, 2017; Berenstain, 2016). What is spacetime curvature? For a causal structuralist, we understand what spacetime curvature is only when we know what it does, which involves understanding how it affects objects with mass (Goff, 2019; Ryder, 2009; Saatsi, 2017; Dorato, 2000). But we understand this only when we know what mass is. And so, we find ourselves in a classic “Catch 22”: we can understand the nature of mass only when we know what spacetime curvature is, but we can understand the nature of spacetime curvature only when we know what mass is (Goff, 2017; Azzano, 2023; Berenstain, 2016).
Causal structuralists often contend that the circularity objection begs the question (in the technical sense of assuming in the premise of your argument the very thing you are trying to prove) by assuming that the definition of a given property, such as mass, must be given in isolation from all other properties (Berenstain, 2016; Goff, 2017). Causal structuralism, they say, implies a kind of holism, whereby the nature of a given thing cannot be understood in isolation from all other things (Goff, 2017). And so, the very demand for an account of “mass” in isolation from “spacetime curvature” would seem to be premised on the assumption that causal structuralism is false (Goff, 2017). If causal structuralism is true, then mass and spacetime curvature (and everything else) must be defined “all at once.”*14
I agree that mass can be uniquely identified - as it were, honed in on - in terms of its place in the abstract pattern of causal relationships realized by the entire network of physical properties (Goff, 2017). But doing this doesn’t tell us what mass does (Goff, 2017; Berenstain, 2016). And according to causal structuralism, physical properties are defined in terms of what they do: by the effect they have on the concrete physical world (Goff, 2017). Thus, if causal structuralism is true, in order to know the nature of a physical property, we need to know what that property does and not merely its place in an abstract pattern of causal relationships (Goff, 2017; Berenstain, 2016).
This is all getting very abstract, so let’s take a ludicrously simple example. Suppose I have three matchboxes, and I tell you the first contains a “SPLURGE,” the second a “BLURGE,” and the third a “KURGE.” You innocently ask me, “Oh really, what’s a SPLURGE?” I answer, “A SPLURGE is something that makes BLURGES.” Now, you can’t really understand my answer until you know what a BLURGE is, so naturally your next question is, “Fine, so what’s a BLURGE??” I respond, “Oh, that’s easy, a BLURGE is a thing that makes KURGES.” But, in a similar way, you can’t understand this answer until you know what a KURGE is, and so - starting to get a bit irritated - you now demand to know: “What on earth is a KURGE???!!” My response: “It’s something that makes SPLURGES.”
The same is true, although in a more complex way, of the description of physical reality offered by the causal structuralist. If causal structuralism is true, it is logically impossible to gain understanding of what anything does and hence logically impossible to gain understanding of what anything is (Hawthorne, 2001). This evidently is an unintelligible view (Goff, 2017; Hawthorne, 2001).
The panpsychist avoids the circularity objection by giving a noncircular account of the intrinsic nature of matter (Goff, 2017). The character of a given subjective experience is not defined in terms of anything outside of that experience (Goff, 2017). The pain I’m currently feeling has an intrinsic character that I’m immediately aware of in having the experience (Goff, 2017). One can’t convey that character to someone who hasn’t had the experience. Nonetheless, in having the experience and thereby grasping its character, you have a complete understanding of what it involves. And hence, in principle, the panpsychist can give an account of the nature of a physical property, such as mass, without deferring to some other physical property and thereby getting into a vicious circle or regress (Goff, 2017). If mass is a form of consciousness, then in specifying the character of that form of consciousness you’ve thereby specified what mass is. (Goff, 2017)
Here’s another way of putting the circularity objection. If every word was defined in terms of other words, then all definitions would ultimately be circular, and language could never reach beyond itself. In order to get meaning going, we need to have some primitive concepts that are not defined in terms of other concepts. The concepts of physical science are not primitive but inter-defined: mass is characterized in terms of distance and force, distance and force are characterized in terms of other phenomena, and so on until we get back to mass. Our concepts of consciousness, in contrast, are primitive in the required sense: a feeling is not defined in terms of anything other than itself.
This is not to say that there are not problems here, nor that we are anywhere near having a plausible candidate for what form of consciousness mass is (or any of the other basic physical properties). Nonetheless, the point remains that panpsychism does not suffer from the circularity that plagues causal structuralism.
Thus, the central point of this aforementioned argument is that causal structuralism creates a circular dependency between properties, such as mass and spacetime curvature, making it impossible to fully understand either without presupposing an understanding of the other.
Vitally, this argument presses us to the conclusion that there must be more to physical entities than what they do: physical things must also have an ‘intrinsic nature’, as philosophers tend to put it. However, given that physics is restricted to telling us only about the behaviour of physical entities – electrons, quarks and indeed spacetime itself – it leaves us completely in the dark about their intrinsic nature. Physics tells us what matter does, but not what it is.
To summarise this segment, the central critique of causal structuralism lies in its inability to provide a foundational explanation for the intrinsic nature of matter, as it defines properties solely in terms of their relations and behaviours. This approach leads to an infinite regress or circular dependency, as seen in the relationship between mass and spacetime curvature, where understanding one requires prior understanding of the other. Such reasoning renders the world unintelligible, suggesting that physical entities must possess more than their observable behaviors - they must have an intrinsic nature. However, since physics focuses only on describing what matter does, it offers no insight into what matter intrinsically is. This gap highlights the strength of the intrinsic nature argument in panpsychism, which asserts that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter. The reasoning is as follows: physics does not provide insight into the intrinsic nature of matter. The only window we have into the intrinsic nature of matter is through access to our minds – which reveals consciousness. Therefore, it follows that the intrinsic nature of matter is best understood as consciousness.
1.3 Ockham’s Razor:
Based on this aforementioned point, panpsychism is supported by its simplicity (Goff, 2019). This was highlighted by Eddington, with a multi-point form of reasoning in which he utilises: firstly, physics tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature of matter; and secondly, the only intrinsic nature we are directly aware of is consciousness, experienced within the matter of our own brains (Eddington, 2019). Therefore, from this, panpsychism proposes that the intrinsic nature of all matter is continuous with the consciousness we experience. This simplicity, coupled with its ability to integrate consciousness into the scientific understanding of reality, makes panpsychism a compelling theory that fills the gaps left by physical science. Eddington’s proposal argues that the simplest and most coherent explanation for the intrinsic nature of matter is that it is continuous across the universe, with the same intrinsic nature present both inside and outside of brains: forms of consciousness.
Evidently, a central strength of this argument is that this avoids the need for positing two entirely distinct intrinsic natures for matter - one within brains and one outside of them. This "simplicity argument" is grounded in the scientific principle of preferring explanations that minimise unnecessary assumptions, namely Ockham’s Razor. Just as Einstein’s theory of relativity is preferred over alternatives for its elegance and simplicity, panpsychism’s explanation of matter as intrinsically conscious is favoured because it unifies rather than divides our understanding of reality. Rejecting panpsychism would require evidence or reasoning to suggest that matter possesses two separate intrinsic natures, which no alternative theory provides. By integrating consciousness into the intrinsic nature of matter, panpsychism unifies mind and matter in a way that avoids the problems of dualism and materialism. Dualism fails to explain how the mind and body interact, creating a disjointed picture of reality; whereas, materialism offers unity but excludes consciousness entirely, leaving a significant gap in its explanatory framework. Panpsychism elegantly combines the unity of materialism with an explanation for consciousness, providing a more complete and cohesive understanding of reality.
