An Investigation: The Relationship Between Metaphysics & Politics.
What is the connection, if any, between metaphysics and politics?
The relationship between metaphysics and politics may not seem immediately apparent; however, upon closer inspection, the two fields are inextricably connected. Metaphysics, like many topics in philosophy, is a contested field. However, for present purposes, it is sufficient to take a straightforward and literal view, which is that metaphysics is simply that which is beyond physics (Laurence, 1998). In other words, metaphysics consists of claims about the nature of reality in which cannot in principle be investigated or tested by physical science (Adams, 1999). This includes questions of ontology, namely the study of what there is, and what existing things are like in their most fundamental features (Koons and Pickavance, 2015). Politics, on the other hand, deals with the organisation of governance systems, power relations and administrative justice (Axford et al., 2005).
This essay explores the intrinsic connection between metaphysics and politics, arguing that political values and systems are inevitably grounded in metaphysical assumptions. Firstly, it examines how religious metaphysical beliefs, particularly those related to God and divine order, provide an objective foundation for political values such as justice, rights, and governance. This argument is illustrated through the philosophy of John Locke, who ties natural rights to a metaphysical understanding of God’s creation. Secondly, the essay addresses the fact-to-value dichotomy proposed by Hume, which suggests a separation between empirical facts and moral values, and challenges this notion by arguing that facts are inherently value-laden and shaped by metaphysical beliefs. Complementing this, shall be the demonstration that even secular political ideologies, such as Marxism, rely on metaphysical conceptions of human nature and fulfilment to prescribe political systems. Overall, the essay asserts that the connection between metaphysics and politics is essential, unavoidable, and foundational to any coherent political system or ideology.
Firstly, the argument laid out henceforth shall state that metaphysical beliefs provide an objective foundation for political values, such as justice, rights, and governance. This is particularly evident in how beliefs about God and related entities implicitly ground political beliefs, which are fundamentally rooted in these metaphysical views (Janssens, 2015; Adams, 1999). However, before explaining this relationship, it is necessary to interrogate the relationship between metaphysics and religion in order to lay the groundwork for this following argument.
Religion is one of the most representative forms of metaphysical belief, encompassing life within the framework of the divine, typically through a deity (Adams, 1999). Such beliefs have profoundly influenced political traditions throughout history (Plant, 2001). While the idea of the divine distinguishes religious thought from other belief systems, it does not fully capture the essence of religion, because religion transcends mere theories of existence or layers of reality; it embodies a way of life deeply connected to the spiritual (Adams, 1999). In attributing spiritual - and therefore metaphysical - significance to the world, religion simultaneously assigns ethical meaning (Adams, 1999). This is because religions moralise reality, embedding it with values deemed objective and independent of human perception, presenting good and evil as active forces with presence and power in the world (Janssens, 2015; Adams, 1999).
As articulated by Adams (1999), science is no more capable of investigating the objective existence of values than it is of examining entities like gods or souls. Consequently, while religion’s status as a metaphysical belief primarily stem from its assertion of spiritual entities, it also gains its metaphysical nature by objectifying values, making them part of an external reality (Janssens, 2015; Adams, 1999). Most philosophers argue that values cannot exist independently of us; rather, they are something we impose upon reality, entirely distinct from facts (Adams, 1999. However, religions inherently challenge this principle; indeed, they are defined by this very departure (Adams, 1999). Religious understanding endows objective reality with ethical significance by theoretically blending the realms of fact and value (Janssens, 2015; Adams, 1999). For instance, in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, God is not merely described as good; God and goodness are intrinsically defined by one another (Adams, 1999). For believers, “God is good” is not a simple evaluation but a factual statement describing God’s very essence - a necessary truth against which other claims about God and the world are tested (Janssens, 2015; Adams, 1999). Moreover, since no scientific method can definitively determine what is ethically good or bad, values are rightfully excluded from scientific inquiry (Lennox, 2019; Adams, 1999). Any theory that systematically integrates concepts of good and bad, right, and wrong, or superiority and inferiority as part of objective reality is inherently metaphysical (Adams, 1999). From this, the assertion being made is that such a fusion is fundamental to the entirety of political normative theories, however specifically in this instance, the case of metaphysical views of God – in which ground certain political beliefs (Adams, 1999).
To illustrate this, it is particularly relevant to explore John Locke’s philosophy. Locke asserted that all knowledge originates from sensory experience and dismissed the idea of innate ideas (Locke, 1847). Yet, in Two Treatises of Government, he declares that Natural Law is "plain writ in the Hearts Of All Mankind" (Locke, 1847; Adams, 1999; Glat, 1981). Critically, it is impossible to empirically prove that anyone possesses God-given rights of any kind (Dunn, 1982; Strauss, 1953). Locke argued that natural law endowed individuals with inalienable rights, including life, liberty, and property, which exist independently of human-made laws (Locke, 1847; Strauss, 1953). For Locke, these natural rights are fundamental, and governments are established primarily to protect them (Locke, 1847; Strauss, 1953). This notion is entirely metaphysical, representing an assertion about the intrinsic nature of humanity that no science - whether physical or otherwise - can confirm or refute (Adams, 1999).
Therefore, according to Locke, we find a metaphysical conception of humanity rooted within a metaphysical view of Nature (Adams, 1999). Locke contends that natural law grants individuals certain inalienable rights, grounded in the belief that the natural world is God’s creation for humanity (Adams, 1999; Strauss, 1953). Locke treats the right to property as a God-given aspect of human nature, asserting that governments respecting this right are just, while those that do not are tyrannical and lose their legitimacy (Strauss, 1953). Thus, in Locke’s political framework - and, indeed, in broader political thought and governance forms - metaphysical beliefs, in this case the notion of God, serve as objective foundations for political values such as justice, rights, and governance.
Overall, the central argument being made in this first segment is that metaphysical beliefs, such as those rooted in religion, provide the necessary ethical and ontological framework for establishing and legitimising political systems by grounding values like justice, rights, and governance in objective, universal principles that transcend empirical verification. This highlights the deep and interconnected relationship between metaphysics and politics, as many political systems are grounded in metaphysical beliefs about God and related entities. These beliefs shape political views both on an individual level and at a societal level, particularly influencing ideas about what constitutes a good political society.
However, to oppose this aforementioned point, it could be argued that while this argument shows a link between metaphysics and politics within a religious framework, it does not necessarily extend to non-religious frameworks. This perspective suggests that non-religious political ideologies exist independently of metaphysics, as they do not rely on defining moral values in relation to God or other deities, thus advocating for the position that metaphysical views of reality do not always have an inextricable connection with politics (Adams, 1999). In Locke’s case, for example, and presumably in any context where a deity is invoked, this connection provides a foundation from which we can derive certain principles and rights, such as life, liberty, and property (Locke, 1998; Adams, 1999). This is because, for instance, Locke’s concept of natural law is fundamentally religious, and this raises the question of whether the shift from fact to value, from description to prescription, can occur in non-religious political frameworks, especially in normative political theories that do not appear overtly metaphysical (Adams, 1999; Strauss, 1953). In other words, can values be made objective - as part of the natural order -, and, if so, how is this achieved?
To explain this fully, before highlighting the case study of Marxism, it is worth exploring the fact-to-value argument hinted at above. According to Hume, facts — statements about what “is” — are fundamentally distinct from values — statements about what “ought” to be (Mete, 2022). This dichotomy suggests that objective, empirical facts can be separated from subjective ethical or moral values, therefore advocating for a position in which metaphysics and politics are not necessarily inextricably connected, insofar as one can assert an objective, empirical fact, which supposedly isn’t necessarily related to ethical or metaphysical beliefs (Mete, 2022; Putnam, 2004). Further, Hume’s dichotomy asserts that factual statements about reality can be objectively determined, while moral or ethical values are subjective and cannot be derived from those facts (Putnam, 2004). For example, the statement, "economic inequality exists" is a factual observation, but the conclusion that "economic inequality is unjust" is a value judgment. According to Hume, you cannot logically infer the latter from the former (Määttänen). Importantly, this separation suggests that politics does not necessarily need to be connected to metaphysical ideas about the nature of reality, as ethical or normative decisions can be made independently of metaphysical claims (Putnam, 2004).
Metaphysics concerns itself with the nature of reality — what exists and the fundamental features of existence (Laurence, 1998). For example, metaphysical debates might address whether free will exists or if the universe has a purpose (Laurence, 1998). However, these discussions are descriptive and do not inherently prescribe how we should organise society or what constitutes justice. Because metaphysics is about describing reality, it does not necessarily provide a direct basis for political norms or values, therefore arguing against the idea of an inextricable connection between metaphysics and politics (Hume, 1740). Thus, if facts and values are distinct, political systems can be based on empirical, observable facts rather than metaphysical speculations (Määttänen). Political decisions can be guided by practical considerations — such as economic data, social behavior, or historical trends — without needing to rely on abstract metaphysical ideas about reality. This implies that politics can function independently of metaphysical frameworks.
However, contemporary challenges to this dichotomy argue that facts are not neutral; they are inherently value-laden (Putnam 2002). This is because, contrary to the fact-to-value dichotomy, the pursuit, selection, and interpretation of facts are influenced by underlying ethical principles and metaphysical assumptions (Putnam 2002). In the context of political theory, this challenge demonstrates that no political framework can be purely empirical or objective, therefore further revealing the connection between metaphysics and politics. Even theories that claim to be based on scientific or factual observations carry implicit values and metaphysical commitments (Putnam 2002). For instance, when a political system emphasises individual rights or collective welfare, these priorities are grounded in deeper metaphysical beliefs about human nature, justice, and the ideal social order. Political concepts such as freedom, equality, and justice are not merely empirical descriptors; they embody normative judgments that reflect what society deems valuable and desirable (Putnam 2002).
Furthermore, the recognition that facts are value-laden means that even secular political theories cannot avoid metaphysical questions about the nature of reality and morality (Putnam 2002). For example, the decision to pursue policies that promote economic growth, social equality, or environmental sustainability is not just a matter of empirical evidence; it reflects values about what constitutes a good society. These values, in turn, rest on metaphysical assumptions about the essence of human flourishing and the moral duties we owe to one another and the environment.
Thus, the challenge to the fact-to-value dichotomy reinforces the idea that politics and metaphysics are deeply intertwined. Political theories, even those that present themselves as neutral or scientifically grounded, rely on ethical and metaphysical assumptions to give meaning to their objectives and methods. This perspective ultimately underscores that political discourse is not merely a matter of policy or empirical analysis, but a reflection of deeper metaphysical commitments about reality, morality, and human purpose, therefore complimenting the argument pertaining to the notion that metaphysics and politics and inextricably connected.
Building on this argument is the case study of Marxism, which demonstrates that even when a political ideology is grounded in a secular or atheistic framework, it still relies on metaphysical beliefs. At the core of Marxism is a metaphysical conception of human nature, which underscores this point. Locke developed a version of Natural Law in which individuals are endowed with natural rights, from which political prescriptions can be derived (Locke, 1847; Adams, 1999). This represents a moralised view of human nature, and similar conceptions are found in all normative theories, whether religious or secular (Adams, 1999). Humans are perceived as inherently free or equal, or as defined by race, nation, sex, their relationship with nature, or other ethically significant qualities (Adams, 1999). Given that these values are central to human nature, human flourishing is seen as achievable only in societies that uphold freedom, equality, harmony with nature, or whichever values are essential to a specific ideology (Adams, 1999). This moral perspective, which closely connects values with human nature and the ideal society, permeates every normative political theory, thus representing a direct and unavoidable link between metaphysics and politics (Adams, 1999). Such moralised views of human nature are inherently metaphysical, as they attempt to define the essence of human nature. This is because science cannot prove that humans inherently need freedom to flourish, that a specific racial hierarchy is necessary, or that any particular type of society represents the ultimate good for humanity (Lennox, 2019; Adams, 1999).
Karl Marx’s work provides a clear example of how metaphysical beliefs permeate every aspect of a secular ideological or normative political theory, thus reinforcing the prior claim that metaphysical beliefs have an inextricable connection to politics – even in the context of a secular theory (Kalin, 1979). Although Marx aimed to be rigorously scientific and promoted militant atheism and materialism, his theory still contains a moralised - and therefore metaphysical - view of human nature (Kalin, 1979). Marx saw humanity as inherently creative, building its own world through labor, yet denied true fulfilment and recognition due to class divisions and exploitation (Mukhopadhyay, 2020; Kalin, 1979; Adams, 1999). This leads to alienation, where individuals are separated from the world, others, and even themselves (Mukhopadhyay, 2020; Adams, 1999). For Marx, this alienation is a profound harm, as it degrades and dehumanises individuals, preventing them from fully developing as human beings (Mukhopadhyay, 2020).
Importantly, this is not a psychological theory that can be observed or tested, nor are there any measurable symptoms (Adams, 1999). For instance, a Victorian factory worker might feel perfectly happy, but from a Marxist perspective, he is still alienated. Simply by being employed by a capitalist, he is seen as degraded, exploited, and dehumanised (Adams, 1999). According to Marx, people are only truly free and fulfilled when they control their own labor and express their true nature (Mukhopadhyay, 2020; Adams, 1999; Kalin, 1979). This "true nature" is a moral and metaphysical idea, defining humanity in terms of good and bad qualities and highlighting the fundamental essence of what it means to be a human being (Kalin, 1979; Adams, 1999). Thus, it is a metaphysical view of humanity, comparable to the belief that each person has God-given natural rights, as it claims to reveal a deeper reality that goes beyond the observable facts that science can study (Adams, 1999). Moreover, Marx presents an essential human psyche as the driving force of life, one that is tainted and distorted by exploitation (Adams, 1999). In his view, history unfolds as a drama in which the psyche is broken down and fragmented, only to be reassembled, reconstructed, and ultimately restored to a higher, more self-aware state of wholeness once the historical process is complete (Adams, 1999). Nature is good and goodness is being true to one's nature: that is, that which it is in one's nature to become, a fully integrated human being, living in creative harmony with fellow human beings in the world (Adams, 1999). Therefore, Marx deals here in processes and states of affairs behind empirical reality that cannot be discerned without the aid of the theory, which is of necessity both metaphysical and ethical.
Thus, in common with all normative political theories, Marxism – for instance - has a metaphysical foundation because it rests on a vision of human nature, the essence of man, and an ideal state of fulfilment that cannot be empirically verified (Adams, 1999). Just as religious frameworks tie moral values to metaphysical beliefs about divine order, Marx’s theory prescribes a vision of the good society based on a metaphysical understanding of human nature (Kalin, 1979; Adams, 1999). This argument underscores the inextricable connection between metaphysics and politics. Normative political theories are not merely influenced by metaphysical assumptions — they are systematically and necessarily grounded in them. Metaphysical beliefs about human nature, values, and morality shape the very structure of these theories, providing the foundation for objective moral principles that transcend empirical validation (Adams, 1999). Therefore, whether religious or secular, all normative political theories rely on metaphysical concepts to define the essence of humanity and the values that underpin a just society.
To conclude, the connection between metaphysics and politics is inextricable. This essay has demonstrated that political values and systems are deeply rooted in metaphysical assumptions about reality, human nature, and morality. Whether through religious frameworks that ground justice and rights in beliefs about God and divine order, or through secular ideologies like Marxism that rely on metaphysical views of human nature and fulfilment, metaphysical foundations shape political thought. Further, the challenges to the fact-to-value dichotomy further reinforce that even empirical facts are influenced by underlying values and metaphysical commitments, thus disputing the fallacy that facts can be completely objective or neutral. This is because the process of identifying, interpreting, and applying facts inherently involves decisions about what is important, relevant, or meaningful, which are driven by ethical and metaphysical frameworks. Therefore, the intertwining of metaphysics and politics reveals that concepts of justice, rights, and governance cannot be fully understood without considering the fundamental assumptions that give them meaning and legitimacy, overall arguing that the connection between metaphysics and politics is essential, unavoidable, and foundational to any coherent political system or ideology.
References:
1) Adams, I. (1999). The Inevitability Of Political Metaphysics. Journal Of Political Ideologies, pp. 269-288.
2) Axford, B., Browne, V., Huggins, R. and Isaacs, R. (2005). Politics: An Introduction. Routledge.
3) Dunn, J. (1982). The Political Thought Of John Locke: A Historical Account Of The Argument Of The 'Two Treatises of Government'. Cambridge University Press.
4) Glat, M. (1981). John Locke's Historical Sense. The Review Of Politics, 43(1), pp.3-21.
5) Hume, David. (1740) 1995. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by Mark C. Rooks. The Complete Works and Correspondence of David Hume. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation.
6) Janssens, J. (2015). Metaphysics of God. In The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy (pp. 236-247). Routledge.
7) Kalin, M.G. (1979). Marx Against Metaphysics. Metaphilosophy, 10(3/4), pp.306-314.
8) Koons, R.C., Pickavance, T. (2015). Metaphysics: the fundamentals. John Wiley & Sons.
9) Laurence, C.M.S. (1998). Contemporary Readings In The Foundations Of Metaphysics.
10) Locke, J. (1847). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Kay & Troutman.
11) Lennox, J. (2019). Can Science Explain Everything? The Good Book Company.
12) Mukhopadhyay, R. (2021). Karl Marx’s theory of alienation. SSRN.
13) Mete, B., (2022). THE END OF THE FACT-VALUE DICHOTOMY: A NEO-ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University).
14) Määttänen, P., (2023). Facts and Values After David Hume. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law-Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique, 36(1), pp.17-29.
15) Plant, R. (2001). Politics, Theology, And History (Vol. 13). Cambridge University Press.
16) Putnam, H., (2004). The Collapse Of The Fact / Value Dichotomy And Other Essays. Harvard University Press.
17) Strauss, L. (1953). Natural Right And History. Charles R. Walgreen Foundation.
