An Investigation Into The Intrinsic Nature Of Matter: The Case For Consciousness Predating Life.

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The Plausibility of Panpsychism: An Argumentative Exploration

Is Everything Conscious?

Acknowledgements:

I extend my deepest gratitude to all the individuals who helped me throughout my studies. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Tom Rossetter, whose expertise, patience, and unwavering support have been pivotal throughout this journey. Dr. Rossetter approachability and commitment to academic excellence have not only guided me through the complexities of this research but have also instilled in me a profound appreciation for the depth and breadth of our field. It is my earnest wish that this work reflects the high standards he embodies and contributes meaningfully to our collective understanding.

Abstract:

This dissertation examines the plausibility of the cosmos instantiating mental properties through the lens of panpsychism, which posits that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality, intrinsic to all matter. The dissertation shall explore key arguments and addresses significant objections. Central to the analysis is the intrinsic nature problem, highlighting physics’ inability to describe the true nature of matter beyond its behaviors. Panpsychism is proposed as a parsimonious and explanatory framework, uniting subjective experience with scientific understanding. Criticisms, such as the lack of empirical evidence, are addressed by drawing parallels with historical scientific theories like Darwinism and general relativity, both of which relied on logical deduction and explanatory power before empirical validation. Using inference to the best explanation, the study argues that panpsychism provides a coherent account of consciousness that aligns with scientific principles. Vitally, a significant solution to the combination problem has been posted, which hones in on questioning how simple conscious entities combine to form complex minds. The solution posited is novel, and reframes the combination problem as a broader challenge in understanding emergent complexity, analogous to difficulties in explaining biological systems’ origins in evolutionary theory. The dissertation concludes that panpsychism offers a compelling framework for understanding consciousness as intrinsic to the cosmos. By addressing philosophical and scientific challenges, it bridges the gap between physical and mental properties, advancing the discourse on consciousness and the fundamental nature of reality.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1   Overview:

This dissertation explores the question of whether it is plausible that the cosmos, as a whole, instantiates mental properties. This inquiry lies at the intersection of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and scientific theory, examining fundamental questions about consciousness, reality, and the intrinsic nature of matter. At its core, the study engages with panpsychism, a philosophical perspective that posits consciousness as a fundamental feature of the universe, intrinsic to all matter (Seager, 2020). The dissertation aims to provide a thorough and critical exploration of panpsychism, addressing its explanatory strengths, philosophical implications, and challenges.

The analysis is structured around three core arguments that together form a cohesive framework for understanding the plausibility of panpsychism. Firstly, it examines the intrinsic nature problem, which highlights a significant limitation in physics: while it describes the behavior and interactions of matter, it leaves unexplored the intrinsic properties of matter itself (Seager, 2006; Eddington, 2019). Building on the works of Russell and Eddington, the dissertation argues that consciousness, as directly experienced in human minds, offers the most plausible candidate for the intrinsic nature of matter, filling the explanatory gap left by physicalist approaches (Adams, 2007; Eddington, 2019). This argument not only aligns with the principle of parsimony but also provides a unified framework for bridging the divide between subjective experience and physical reality (Goff, 2017).

Second, the dissertation addresses criticisms of panpsychism, particularly its lack of empirical evidence, a common critique of speculative philosophical theories (Symes, 2022). By drawing parallels with historical scientific theories, such as Darwinism and general relativity, which initially relied on abstract, logical reasoning and explanatory coherence rather than direct empirical verification, the dissertation defends panpsychism as a scientifically legitimate framework that is worthy of further investigation (Goff, 2017; Thomas, 2022; Johnson and Provine, 1994). The theory utilises the method of inference to the best explanation to argue that panpsychism’s ability to account for consciousness provides a powerful explanatory advantage, even in the absence of direct observational support.

Third, the dissertation tackles the combination problem, a major challenge to panpsychism that questions how simple conscious entities, such as fundamental particles, combine to form the unified and complex consciousness observed in living beings (Chalmers, 2017; Coleman, 2014). This problem is reframed as a broader issue of understanding emergent complexity, analogous to challenges in evolutionary biology and information theory (Meyer, 2021; Berlinski, 1996). By situating the combination problem within a larger scientific context, the study highlights that this limitation is not unique to panpsychism but reflects a general gap in our knowledge about how complexity arises in nature.

By engaging with these philosophical arguments and challenges, this dissertation aims to establish that panpsychism offers a compelling and plausible framework for understanding that consciousness is a fundamental aspect to reality, present in all things. The study goes beyond merely defending panpsychism; it also contributes to the broader discourse on the nature of consciousness, challenging conventional paradigms in science and philosophy. In doing so, it seeks to bridge the gap between metaphysical speculation and scientific inquiry, providing a foundation for future explorations into the fundamental nature of reality.

1.2. Context:

The question of whether the cosmos instantiates mental properties is a profound and far-reaching inquiry that challenges our understanding of consciousness, reality, and the universe's fundamental nature. It is a subject of immense importance because it touches on some of the most enduring and complex philosophical questions: What is the nature of consciousness? How does it arise? And what is its relationship to the physical world? These questions not only lie at the heart of metaphysics and philosophy of mind but also have implications for disciplines such as physics, neuroscience, and even artificial intelligence.

Understanding consciousness is one of humanity’s greatest intellectual challenges (Chalmers, 2017). Despite significant advancements in neuroscience and cognitive science, the “hard problem of consciousness” - how subjective experience arises from physical processes—remains unresolved (Chalmers, 2017). Exploring alternative perspectives, such as panpsychism, offers a chance to rethink and expand the boundaries of our understanding, challenging the conventional materialist paradigm that dominates scientific discourse (Goff, 2017). By considering consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality, panpsychism provides a framework that could revolutionise how we approach both philosophical and scientific problems related to the mind (Skrbina, 2017; Goff, 2017).

Moreover, this discussion has implications that extend beyond academic philosophy and science. The nature of consciousness directly impacts how we view ourselves, our place in the universe, and our relationship with the natural world. If consciousness is not confined to biological systems but instead permeates the cosmos, this perspective could reshape ethical considerations, influencing how we interact with the environment, non-human entities, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. It could foster a more interconnected worldview, where mental properties are seen as intrinsic to the fabric of existence rather than as isolated phenomena.

Finally, this inquiry is important because it addresses a gap in contemporary discourse, providing readers with an opportunity to engage with a perspective that bridges the divide between subjective experience and objective reality. As science advances, there is a growing recognition that the traditional materialist framework may not fully account for the richness of human experience or the complexities of the universe (Nagel, 2012). By exploring panpsychism and its implications, this dissertation invites readers to think critically about the foundational assumptions that underpin their understanding of reality, encouraging them to reconsider the possibilities of what the universe truly is. In this sense, the subject matter is not just a philosophical abstraction but a gateway to reimagining the cosmos and our place within it. 

Chapter 2: What Is The Intrinsic Nature Of Matter?

2.1 Solution To Intrinsic Nature Problem

Firstly, the following argument makes the case for a solution to the Intrinsic Nature Problem in physics. The case made here is that physics – while being a valuable and successful tool – for telling us about the contours and facets or reality, it is not a tool that can tell us about the intrinsic nature of matter (Goff, 2019; Eddington, 2019). Thus, through logical deduction, it shall be argued that the sole window into the nature of matter that we have, is that of consciousness (Eddington, 2019).

One of the strongest arguments supporting panpsychism is the Intrinsic Matter Argument, articulated by philosophers like Russell and Eddington (Goff, 2019). It can be asserted that physics, while immensely successful in describing the relationships between physical properties like mass, charge, and force, tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature of these properties (Goff, 2019). Physics is primarily a tool for prediction, using equations to describe behaviors and interactions without addressing what these properties are in themselves (Eddington, 2019; Jarocki, 2024). Eddington highlights that physics provides "pointer readings" - measurable outcomes observed through instruments - but offers no insight into the true nature of matter (Eddington, 2019; Goff, 2019). For example, while physics can describe the behavior of mass and force, such as in Newton’s law of gravity, it cannot explain what mass or force intrinsically are (Goff, 2019).

To explain this in more detail, consider an electron’s properties - such as mass and charge – which are defined in terms of their behaviors: mass involves gravitational attraction and resistance to acceleration, while charge describes interactions with other charges (Goff, 2019).  These descriptions focus exclusively on relationships and interactions, leaving the intrinsic nature of the electron unexplained (Goff, 2019; Eddington, 2019). Another sanitised example can be given to simplistic explain this point. Consider a chess piece. Knowing how a bishop moves tells us what it does on the board, but not what it is - whether it is made of wood or plastic (Goff, Seager, and Hermanson, 2001). Thus, there must be more to an electron than its external behaviors, an intrinsic reality that physics does not address (Eddington, 1920; Goff, 2019). Therefore, this limitation asserts that while physics is a powerful predictive tool, it cannot explain the true nature of matter (Goff, 2019). However, as human beings, we do have a small window into the intrinsic nature of matter: the consciousness we directly experience in our own brains (Goff, 2019; Eddington, 2019). While physics provides "pointer readings" (measurements of external properties), the subjective reality of consciousness reveals something about the intrinsic nature of the matter within us (Eddington, 2019).

Centrally, the reason why this proposal gains credibility is because there appears to be no alternative candidate for the intrinsic nature of matter (Eddington, 1920). Physical science remains silent on what matter is beyond its behaviors (Eddington, 1933). If observation fails to provide clues, we are left with two options: the panpsychist view, where matter’s intrinsic nature is rooted in consciousness, or Locke’s idea that matter is an unknowable “we know not what.” From this, panpsychism, offers a unified picture of reality, emerging as the more coherent and explanatory framework (Eddington, 1933).

The argument can be summarised as follows: physics does not provide insight into the intrinsic nature of matter. The only window we have into the intrinsic nature of matter is through access to our minds – which reveals consciousness. Therefore, it follows that the intrinsic nature of matter is best understood as consciousness.

2.2 Causal Structuralism:

Although this argument may initially seem convincing, many critics argue that it is fundamentally flawed. They contend that the concept of "intrinsic nature of matter" is misleading and inherently problematic (Hawthorne, 2001). Instead, they propose that there is no intrinsic nature of matter; rather, reality is defined solely by the relationships between things (Hawthorne, 2001; Schneider, 2017). Consequently, if intrinsic matter does not exist, the idea that human experience offers a unique window into matter - and then extrapolating this perspective outward to all matter - is a deeply flawed line of reasoning.

One of the central arguments posited pertaining to panpsychism is that of the Intrinsic Nature argument; asserting that physics tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature of matter, but rather merely acts as a prediction mechanism for reality (Goff, 2019). Panpsychism thus asserts that – due to no other contenders for the intrinsic nature of matter – the sole window into matter in which we have is conscious experience; thus, the intrinsic nature of matter is consciousness (Eddington, 1933).

Yet, an argument against the notion of intrinsic nature is posited by causal structuralism, a branch of thought which asserts that there is nothing more to the nature of a physical entity, such as an electron, than how it is disposed to behave (Hawthorne, 2001). Thus, if you understand what an electron does, you then know everything that there is to know about its nature (Hawthorne, 2001). On this view of causal structuralism, things are not so much beings as doings (Saatsi, 2017). If one assumes causal structuralism, it becomes possible that the models of physics can completely characterise the nature of physical entities; a mathematical model can capture what an electron does, and in doing so will tell us what the electron is (Hawthorne, 2001). Thus, causal structuralism disputes the notion of “intrinsic nature” of matter, but rather asserts that there is nothing more to the nature of a physical entity than how it is disposed to behave (Hawthorne, 2001; Saatsi, 2017). Vitally, one of the serious arguments in favour of panpsychism is the intrinsic nature argument and if panpsychism can’t defend against the causal structuralists, this delivers a significant blow to the argumentative plausibility of panpsychism.

In order for the intrinsic nature argument of panpsychism to hold, it must be able to adequately defend from the causal structuralists, who assert that the notion of intrinsic nature of matter is wrong. Presented henceforth shall be an array of arguments against causal structuralism, aiming to reaffirm the notion of an intrinsic nature of matter.

One of the central arguments against causal structuralism is the issue that causal structuralists attempt to characterise the nature of matter as merely beings, rather than things, lead either to a vicious regress or a vicious circle (Goff, 2019). According to causal structuralists, we understand the nature of a disposition only when we know the behaviour to which it gives rise when it is manifested (Hawthorne, 2001). For example, the manifestation of flammability is burning; we only know what flammability is when we know that it’s manifested through burning (Goff, 2019). However, assuming causal structuralism, the manifestation of any disposition – how it behaves under certain conditions - will be another disposition, and the manifestation of that disposition will be another disposition, and so on ad infinitum (Goff, 2019). The buck is continually passed, and hence an adequate understanding of the nature of any property is impossible, even for an omniscient being (Goff, 2019). In other words, a causal structuralist world is unintelligible (Goff, 2019). Therefore – if the causal structuralist are correct – then the world is unintelligible, insofar as every property is defined by another property, creating an infinite regress with no foundational explanation (Goff, 2019).

This point can be expressed best through an example. According to general relativity, mass and spacetime stand in a relationship of mutual causal interaction: mass curves spacetime, and the curvature of spacetime in turn affects the behaviour of objects with mass (as matter tends, all things being equal, to follow geodesics though spacetime) (Hobson, Efstathiou and Lasenby, 2006). What is mass? For a causal structuralist, we know what mass is when we know what it does, i.e. when we know the way in which it curves spacetime (Ryder, 2009). But to really understand what this amounts to metaphysically, as opposed to being able merely to make accurate predictions, we need to know what spacetime curvature is (Goff, 2019). What is spacetime curvature? For a causal structuralist, we understand what spacetime curvature is only when we know what it does, which involves understanding how it affects objects with mass (Goff, 2019; Ryder, 2009; Saatsi, 2017). But we understand this only when we know what mass is. And so, we find ourselves in a classic Catch 22: we can understand the nature of mass only when we know what spacetime curvature is, but we can understand the nature of spacetime curvature only when we know what mass is (Goff, 2019).

Causal structuralists often contend that the circularity objection begs the question (in the technical sense of assuming in a premise of your argument the very thing you are trying to prove) by assuming that the definition of a given property, such as mass, must be given in isolation from all other properties (Goff, 2017). Causal structuralism, they say, implies a kind of holism, whereby the nature of a given thing cannot be understood in isolation from all other things (Goff, 2017). And so, the very demand for an account of “mass” in isolation from “spacetime curvature” would seem to be premised on the assumption that causal structuralism is false (Goff, 2017). If causal structuralism is true, then mass and spacetime curvature (and everything else) must be defined “all at once.”*14

I agree that mass can be uniquely identified - as it were, homed in on - in terms of its place in the abstract pattern of causal relationships realized by the entire network of physical properties (Goff, 2017). But doing this doesn’t tell us what mass does (Goff, 2017). And according to causal structuralism, physical properties are defined in terms of what they do: by the effect they have on the concrete physical world (Goff, 2017). Thus, if causal structuralism is true, in order to know the nature of a physical property, we need to know what that property does and not merely its place in an abstract pattern of causal relationships (Goff, 2017).

This is all getting very abstract, so let’s take a ludicrously simple example. Suppose I have three matchboxes, and I tell you the first contains a “SPLURGE,” the second a “BLURGE,” and the third a “KURGE.” You innocently ask me, “Oh really, what’s a SPLURGE?” I answer, “A SPLURGE is something that makes BLURGES.” Now, you can’t really understand my answer until you know what a BLURGE is, so naturally your next question is, “Fine, so what’s a BLURGE??” I respond, “Oh, that’s easy, a BLURGE is a thing that makes KURGES.” But, in a similar way, you can’t understand this answer until you know what a KURGE is, and so - starting to get a bit irritated - you now demand to know: “What on earth is a KURGE???!!” My response: “It’s something that makes SPLURGES.”

The same is true, although in a more complex way, of the description of physical reality offered by the causal structuralist. If causal structuralism is true, it is logically impossible to gain understanding of what anything does and hence logically impossible to gain understanding of what anything is (Hawthorne, 2001). This evidently is an unintelligible view (Goff, 2017; Hawthorne, 2001).

The panpsychist avoids the circularity objection by giving a noncircular account of the intrinsic nature of matter (Goff, 2017). The character of a given subjective experience is not defined in terms of anything outside of that experience (Goff, 2017). The pain I’m currently feeling has an intrinsic character that I’m immediately aware of in having the experience (Goff, 2017). One can’t convey that character to someone who hasn’t had the experience. Nonetheless, in having the experience and thereby grasping its character, you have a complete understanding of what it involves. And hence, in principle, the panpsychist can give an account of the nature of a physical property, such as mass, without deferring to some other physical property and thereby getting into a vicious circle or regress (Goff, 2017). If mass is a form of consciousness, then in specifying the character of that form of consciousness you’ve thereby specified what mass is. (Goff, 2017)

Here’s another way of putting the circularity objection. If every word was defined in terms of other words, then all definitions would ultimately be circular, and language could never reach beyond itself. In order to get meaning going, we need to have some primitive concepts that are not defined in terms of other concepts (). The concepts of physical science are not primitive but inter-defined: mass is characterized in terms of distance and force, distance and force are characterized in terms of other phenomena, and so on until we get back to mass (). Our concepts of consciousness, in contrast, are primitive in the required sense: a feeling is not defined in terms of anything other than itself ().

This is not to say that there are not problems here, nor that we are anywhere near having a plausible candidate for what form of consciousness mass is (or any of the other basic physical properties). Nonetheless, the point remains that panpsychism does not suffer from the circularity that plagues causal structuralism ().

Thus, the central point of this aforementioned argument is that causal structuralism creates a circular dependency between properties, such as mass and spacetime curvature, making it impossible to fully understand either without presupposing an understanding of the other.

Vitally, this argument presses us to the conclusion that there must be more to physical entities than what they do: physical things must also have an ‘intrinsic nature’, as philosophers tend to put it. However, given that physics is restricted to telling us only about the behaviour of physical entities ­– electrons, quarks and indeed spacetime itself – it leaves us completely in the dark about their intrinsic nature. Physics tells us what matter does, but not what it is (https://philosophynow.org/issues/121/The_Case_For_Panpsychism).

To summarise this segment, the central critique of causal structuralism lies in its inability to provide a foundational explanation for the intrinsic nature of matter, as it defines properties solely in terms of their relations and behaviours. This approach leads to an infinite regress or circular dependency, as seen in the relationship between mass and spacetime curvature, where understanding one requires prior understanding of the other. Such reasoning renders the world unintelligible, suggesting that physical entities must possess more than their observable behaviors - they must have an intrinsic nature. However, since physics focuses only on describing what matter does, it offers no insight into what matter intrinsically is. This gap highlights the strength of the intrinsic nature argument in panpsychism, which asserts that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter. The reasoning is as follows: physics does not provide insight into the intrinsic nature of matter. The only window we have into the intrinsic nature of matter is through access to our minds – which reveals consciousness. Therefore, it follows that the intrinsic nature of matter is best understood as consciousness.

2.3 Ockham’s Razor:

Based on this aforementioned point, panpsychism is supported by its simplicity (Goff, 2019). This was highlighted by Eddington, with a multi-point form of reasoning in which he utilises: firstly, physics tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature of matter; and secondly, the only intrinsic nature we are directly aware of is consciousness, experienced within the matter of our own brains (Eddington, 2019). Therefore, from this, panpsychism proposes that the intrinsic nature of all matter is continuous with the consciousness we experience (). This simplicity, coupled with its ability to integrate consciousness into the scientific understanding of reality, makes panpsychism a compelling theory that fills the gaps left by physical science (). Eddington’s proposal argues that the simplest and most coherent explanation for the intrinsic nature of matter is that it is continuous across the universe, with the same intrinsic nature present both inside and outside of brains: forms of consciousness ().

Evidently, a central strength of this argument is that this avoids the need for positing two entirely distinct intrinsic natures for matter - one within brains and one outside of them (). This "simplicity argument" is grounded in the scientific principle of preferring explanations that minimise unnecessary assumptions, namely Ockham’s Razor (). Just as Einstein’s theory of relativity is preferred over alternatives for its elegance and simplicity, panpsychism’s explanation of matter as intrinsically conscious is favoured because it unifies rather than divides our understanding of reality (). Rejecting panpsychism would require evidence or reasoning to suggest that matter possesses two separate intrinsic natures, which no alternative theory provides (). By integrating consciousness into the intrinsic nature of matter, panpsychism unifies mind and matter in a way that avoids the problems of dualism and materialism (). Dualism fails to explain how the mind and body interact, creating a disjointed picture of reality; whereas, materialism offers unity but excludes consciousness entirely, leaving a significant gap in its explanatory framework (). Panpsychism elegantly combines the unity of materialism with an explanation for consciousness, providing a more complete and cohesive understanding of reality ().

Chapter 3: Solution To The “Hard Problem”

Moreover, another convincing argument in favour of panpsychism is that panpsychism elegantly  solves the “Hard Problem” in the domain of consciousness. In contrast to dualism (the view that the universe consists of two kinds of substance, matter and mind), panpsychism does not involve minds popping into existence as certain forms of complex life emerge, or else a soul descending from an immaterial realm at the moment of conception (Demertzi et al, 2009; Goff, 2019). Rather, it claims that human beings are nothing more than complex arrangements of components that are already present in basic matter (Goff, 2019). The only way in which panpsychism differs from physicalism is that the basic components of the material world also involve very basic forms of consciousness, from which the more complex conscious experience of humans and other animals derives (Goff, 2019; Chalmers, 2015).

Physicalists believe that consciousness can be fully accounted for in terms of physical entities and processes (Nagel, 1965). But many scientists and philosophers agree that at present we have not the faintest idea how to make sense of experience being generated from material activity such as the firings of neurons (Nagel, 1965; Chalmers, 2017). This is the difficulty David Chalmers famously called the “Hard Problem” of consciousness (Chalmers, 2017). Physical mechanisms are well-suited for the explanation of physical behaviour; but it’s hard to make sense of a mechanistic explanation of subjective experience (Chalmers, 2017; Goff, 2019). No matter how complex the mechanism, it seems conceivable that it might have functioned in the absence of any experience at all, which seems to imply that mechanistic explanations shed no explanatory light on the existence of experience (Chalmers, 2017).

The "hard problem of consciousness," a term coined by David Chalmers, refers to the profound philosophical challenge of explaining why and how subjective experiences, or qualia, arise from physical processes in the brain (Chalmers, 2017). Unlike the "easy problems" of consciousness, which involve explaining cognitive functions and behaviors (such as memory, perception, and information processing) in terms of neural mechanisms, the hard problem focuses on the qualitative, first-person aspect of experience - what it feels like to be conscious (Chalmers, 2017).

For example, while neuroscience can describe how the brain processes light to produce visual perceptions, it struggles to explain why this process is accompanied by the subjective experience of seeing color, such as the "redness" of red (Chalmers, 2017; Goff, 2019). This gap arises because physical explanations rely on objective, third-person observations, whereas conscious experiences are inherently subjective and first-person (Chalmers, 2017; Goff, 2019).

Chalmers argues that the hard problem is not simply a matter of complexity or technological limitation but represents a fundamental explanatory gap (Chalmers, 2017). Physical processes can explain functional and behavioral phenomena but do not seem capable of addressing why these processes are accompanied by experience at all (Chalmers, 2017). He proposes that consciousness might require new, fundamental principles beyond the current physicalist framework (Chalmers, 2017; Goff, 2019).

Panpsychism offers a vital solution to the “Hard Problem” of consciousness (Goff, 2019; Blamauer, 2011). Rather than trying to account for consciousness entirely in terms of non-conscious elements, panpsychism tries to explain the complex consciousness of humans and other animals in terms of simpler forms of consciousness which are postulated to already exist in simpler forms of matter (Blamauer, 2011). Panpsychists do not simply declare animal and human consciousness a sacred mystery which must have arrived by magic, instead they try to explain animal and human consciousness in terms of more basic forms of consciousness: the consciousness of basic materials entities, such as quarks and electrons (Blamauer, 2011). It is true that consciousness itself is not explained in terms of anything more fundamental: the basic consciousness of basic physical entities is a fundamental postulate of the theory (Goff, 2019). But there is no reason to think that science must always follow the most reductionist path (Goff, 2019). The scientific explanation of electromagnetism which eventually emerged in the 19th century involved the postulation of new fundamental properties and forces: electromagnetic ones (Goff, 2019). Perhaps the scientific explanation of human consciousness, when it eventually arrives, will be similarly non-reductive in postulating fundamental kinds of consciousness (Goff, 2019).

Panpsychism fills this gap by proposing that the intrinsic nature of matter is consciousness or proto-consciousness (Goff, 2019). This means that subjective, qualitative aspects of experience are not emergent properties arising out of complex physical processes but are instead built into the very fabric of matter itself (Goff, 2019; Blamauer, 2011). The hard problem of consciousness asks how subjective experience, or “qualia,” can emerge from the physical processes of the brain (Blamauer, 2011). Panpsychism addresses this by proposing that the physical processes of the brain are themselves proto-conscious in nature (Shan, 2006). When these proto-conscious elements combine in specific ways, they give rise to fully developed conscious experiences, thus solving the hard problem (Shan, 2006).

2.5 The Combination Problem Of Panpsychism:

A critical counterargument must be addressed here. Panpsychism, as previously noted, proposes that human beings are merely intricate arrangements of elements already present in basic matter (Goff, 2019). This perspective is offered as a solution to the "Hard Problem of Consciousness." Panpsychists argue that consciousness is not reducible to anything more fundamental (Shan, 2006). Instead, they claim that panpsychism resolves the hard problem by explaining consciousness as an aggregation of smaller, more basic forms of consciousness (Blamauer, 2011). It asserts that the key distinction between panpsychism and physicalism is that the fundamental components of the material world also possess very basic forms of consciousness, from which the more complex consciousness of humans and other animals emerges (Blamauer, 2011; Goff, 2019). Thus, panpsychism offers a solution to the “Hard Problem” of consciousness by explaining human consciousness not through entirely non-conscious elements but through simpler forms of consciousness inherent in basic matter (Goff, 2019).

However, a significant challenge to this perspective is the "combination problem." If consciousness is indeed a fundamental aspect of the material world and serves as the basis for the complex consciousness observed in humans and other animals, it raises an important question: how do these fundamental components of reality combine to produce the unified and sophisticated experience of human consciousness (Coleman, 2014) ? Addressing this issue is critical for the coherence of the panpsychist framework.

Highlighted by thinkers such as David Chalmers, the central crux of this argument is that it questions how conscious entities, like fundamental particles, combine to form the unified, complex consciousness observed in humans and other animals (Chalmers, 2017; Goff, 2019). If each particle has its own isolated consciousness, how do these “little minds” blend to form a “big mind” (Chalmers, 2017; Coleman, 2014) ? This novel argument posted henceforth shall make the claim that this critique is not necessarily a flaw of panpsychism, but rather is a broader limitation in our current understanding of how particles interact and organise to produce complex matter generally (Meyer, 2014; Berlinski, 1996). It would be unjust to dismiss or criticise panpsychism for its inability to explain precisely how proto-conscious forms give rise to human consciousness. This limitation is not unique to panpsychism but reflects a broader gap in our current scientific understanding (Meyer, 2014; Berlinski, 1996). Science, as it stands, cannot fully explain how fundamental particles combine to form functionally specified biological information or complex structures of any kind (Berlinski, 1996). Therefore, this argument shifts the focus away from the so-called "combination problem" and emphasizes that the issue is not a flaw of panpsychism itself but rather a limitation of our broader understanding of how fundamental particles organize and interact.

As mentioned, one of the most significant challenges for panpsychism is the combination problem, which asks how simple conscious entities, like fundamental particles, combine to form the unified, complex consciousness observed in humans and other animals (James, 1890; Chalmers, 2017). While we understand how physical components, like bricks, combine to create larger structures, it is harder to conceive how small conscious experiences might merge into a single, unified mind (Goff, 2017). If each particle has its own isolated consciousness, how do these “little minds” blend to form a “big mind”? (James, 1890; Goff, 2017) This issue is critical because the ultimate goal of any theory of consciousness is to explain the rich, unified experiences of humans and other sentient beings (Goff, 2019). Materialism attempts to explain animal consciousness through physical brain states, while panpsychism seeks to explain it through particle-level consciousness (Lund, 2014). If panpsychism cannot provide a better solution to this problem than materialism, it risks losing its explanatory advantage (Goff, 2019). Thus, the combination problem highlights a significant gap in panpsychist theory: the need to articulate how simple conscious experiences combine into complex ones (Goff, 2019). Addressing this challenge is essential for panpsychism to fulfil its promise as a comprehensive theory of consciousness (Goff, 2019; Chalmers, 2017).

However, while this seems at first glance to be a significant challenge for panpsychism, this actually is not the case. A novel argument that has been entirely unnoticed in the philosophy of mind, draws in from our knowledge of evolution. One central issue in Darwinian evolution is referred to as the combinatorial inflation argument (Meyer, 2014; Berlinski, 1996). The combinatorial inflation problem in evolution demonstrates the difficulty of explaining how complex, adaptive systems - such functional biological specified information - emerges from simpler, less organised components (Meyer, 2014; Berlinski, 1996). Functionally specified biological information refers to the specific sequences of nucleotides in DNA or amino acids in proteins that are necessary for life to function, also known as DNA  & RNA (Meyer, 2014). Meyer argues that undirected processes like random mutation and natural selection cannot realistically account for the complexity and specificity of this information (Meyer, 2014). The problem stems from the vast number of possible combinations of sequences, coupled with the rarity of functional sequences within that immense space, which Meyer terms "combinatorial inflation" (Berlinski, 1996; Meyer, 2014).

Proteins, which are essential for nearly all biological processes, are made up of chains of amino acids arranged in specific sequences (Meyer, 2014). For a protein with a length of 150 amino acids, the total number of possible sequences is 20 to the power of 150, since there are 20 standard amino acids (Berlinski, 1996). This number - approximately 10 to the power of 195 - represents the total "search space" of possible combinations (Meyer, 2014). To put this into perspective, the number of atoms in the observable universe is estimated to be around 10 to the power of 80 (Meyer, 2014). The sheer size of this combinatorial space poses a daunting problem for evolutionary theory, which posits that functional sequences arose through random mutations over time (Meyer, 2014; Denton, 1986). Meyer emphasises that exploring this vast search space to locate functional sequences is not feasible within the constraints of Earth's history (Eden, 1967). Even with billions of years of evolutionary time and countless organisms reproducing and mutating, the number of possible sequences far exceeds the number of trials nature could have conducted (Meyer, 2014; Denton, 1986). This mismatch between the size of the search space and the resources available for exploration highlights the improbability of finding functional biological molecules through random processes alone (Denton, 1986).

Without getting much further into the nuances pertaining to evolutionary theory, in straightforward terms, this issue apparent to Darwinism fundamentally highlights a significant gap in our understanding of how fundamental particles and information come together to generate biologically functional specified information (Denton and Scott 1986) Meyer uses the example of bike locks to illustrate this concept. A basic bike lock with just three dials, each containing 10 digits (0-9), has 1,000 possible combinations (10 × 10 × 10). If the number of dials is increased to four, the combinations rise to 10,000 (10 × 10 × 10 × 10). As the number of dials continues to grow, the number of possible combinations increases exponentially, making it progressively more difficult to guess the correct combination (Meyer, 2014).

Thus, what I have argued thus far is the following: in the case of evolutionary theory, the combinatorial inflation problem illustrates a critical challenge in explaining how complex systems arise from simpler components through undirected processes (Meyer, 2014; Denton and Scott 1986).

Extending this line of reasoning to panpsychism, it can be argued that the combination problem - often seen as a challenge to panpsychism - is not necessarily a flaw in the theory itself. Instead, it reflects a broader limitation in our knowledge about how particles, atoms, or information interact and organise to produce complex phenomena, whether that be biological functionality or, in the case of panpsychism, consciousness as we experience it today. Thus, the combination problem is less a critique of panpsychism itself and more a reflection of the broader scientific challenge of explaining the emergence of complexity. Panpsychism remains a viable theory, as this issue does not undermine its foundational premise but instead highlights gaps in our understanding of the underlying processes that govern the formation of complex systems generally.

When applied to panpsychism, the combinatorial problem underscores a fundamental question about how elementary particles, each potentially possessing simple mental properties, could combine to form the rich, complex consciousness observed in living organisms (Chalmers, 2017). Yet this challenge mirrors the very same difficulty encountered in explaining how elementary particles combine to form the intricate biological systems found in RNA, DNA, and proteins (Meyer, 2014). The improbability of these combinations occurring purely by chance reflects a general scientific puzzle about how complexity emerges, rather than a specific flaw in panpsychism.

My central argument is that dismissing panpsychism solely due to its inability to resolve the combination problem would be unwarranted, given that our current scientific understanding - including the widely accepted theory of evolution - also falls short of explaining precisely how fundamental particles combine to generate functionally specified biological information.

In summary, the primary reason for introducing this argument is tied to the Hard Problem of consciousness. Panpsychism offers a valid solution by proposing that human consciousness is not derived entirely from non-conscious elements but instead emerges from simpler forms of consciousness inherent in basic matter. However, critics such as Chalmers have raised a significant challenge: if consciousness arises from these simpler forms, panpsychism must be able to explain how elementary particles combine to produce the unified and sophisticated experience of human consciousness. The aforementioned counterargument contends that dismissing panpsychism on this basis is unjustified. This is because similar gaps exist in other widely accepted theories, such as evolutionary theory, which also struggles to explain precisely how fundamental particles combine to generate functionally specified biological information. These limitations reflect not a specific flaw in panpsychism, but a broader shortcoming in our current scientific understanding of how fundamental particles and components combine. Thus, rather than discrediting panpsychism, this challenge highlights the need for further investigation into the mechanisms of combination across both scientific and philosophical domains.

Chapter 4: The Scientific Case For Panpsychism

3.1 Lack Of Empirical Evidence

To address a further common criticism of panpsychism, the following counter argument shall be explored. One of the key critique of panpsychism is its lack of empirical evidence for the existence of mental properties outside of biological systems (Roelofs, 2021). This argument commonly is postulated by figures such as Patricia Churchland, who suggest that panpsychism has no empirical evidence, and thus must be disregarded until empirical evidence can be showcased (Roelofs, 2021). However, in response to this argument, the following central arguments shall be made; firstly, the claim that an absence of empirical evidence does not necessarily undermine the plausibility of a theory. For instance, throughout history, countless scientific insights – such as atomism or the molecular hypothesis – were initially proposed entirely upon abstract reasoning and logic rather than direct observation or measurement data (Chalmers, 2005). This was primarily because the tools required to engage in such an inquiry were insufficient, and thus logical reasoning prevailed as a means of understanding reality itself (). Secondly, it shall be argued that panpsychism also has considerable explanatory power, mirroring the widespread belief today in other various theories in which are deemed to be “acceptable” by the scientific community, including for instance, Darwinism (Goff, 2019; Meyer, 2014).  In addition to this, the scientific method of reasoning titled as  “interference to the best explanation” is utilised (Goff, 2019). Vitally, this scientific method of reasoning is utilised when articulating theories pertaining to “unrepeatable” events throughout history, for instance that of the case for “intelligent design”, or the case for the Big Bang (Meyer, 2014). These events can not be directly observed via repeated experimentation due to their one-off-nature and therefore these scientific theories utilise the mode of reasoning known as inference to the best explanation, and are accepted based upon their explanatory power (Meyer, 2014; Lipton, 2017). The same principle shall be applied here when referring to panpsychism for reasons that shall be outlined momentarily.

The central argument against panpsychism is that while panpsychism proposes that consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality, extending even to elementary particles, there is no scientific observation or measurable data to support the notion that inanimate matter, such as electrons or quarks, possesses any form of awareness or subjective experience (Engelhardt, 2023). This absence of empirical support raises doubts about the plausibility of panpsychism, especially when compared to physicalist theories, which tie consciousness to the complex organisation of matter in living organisms (Engelhardt, 2023). Thus, without concrete evidence, it is argued that panpsychism is a theory to be disregarded, insofar as the theory is entirely speculative and thus has no scientific evidence nor reason to support it (Engelhardt, 2023; Symes, 2022; Bruntrup and Jaskolla, 2016).

Firstly, one of the tenant arguments postulated against this is the following: it is important to recognise that the absence of empirical evidence does not necessarily undermine the plausibility of a theory – and it certainly doesn’t mean that one should disregard this theory entirely (). Historically, many significant scientific insights, such as atomism or the molecular hypothesis, were initially proposed based on abstract reasoning rather than direct observation or measurable data (). These ideas were formulated by philosophers and scientists who, despite lacking the tools to empirically test their theories, posited theories based upon well thought out abstract argumentation (). Eventually, technological advances allowed these hypotheses to be verified and integrated into the scientific framework (). Therefore, based on this historical precedent, this suggests that the same may be true for consciousness (). While panpsychism’s claims about mental properties in fundamental matter cannot currently be falsified or empirically measured, this does not mean that the theory is inherently flawed (). Theories about consciousness may require a future paradigm shift in science to be fully understood and tested (). Just as early philosophers could not empirically observe atoms but made accurate deductions, the nature of consciousness may eventually be incorporated into scientific understanding through advances in technology and methodology ().

The very idea that panpsychism calls for a scientific revolution to accommodate consciousness underscores the limitations of the current scientific paradigm. If consciousness is indeed a fundamental aspect of reality, the existing framework, which focuses predominantly on physical properties and measurable phenomena, may be ill-equipped to capture or explain it. The failure to integrate consciousness into the current paradigm highlights the possibility that new methods, theories, or conceptual frameworks are required to advance our understanding. Just as previous scientific revolutions expanded the boundaries of knowledge, a shift in perspective may be necessary to fully grasp the nature of consciousness, allowing it to be measured and understood within a more comprehensive scientific worldview.

This for instance has been successfully argued by Phillip Goff, of whom asserts that the modern scientific revolution – incepted by Galileo – centred solely on quantitative measurement, while conspicuously disregarding the subjective, qualitative world (Goff, 2017).

In the early 17th century, Galileo sought to transform the study of nature into a rigorous and objective discipline, emphasizing mathematical precision and measurable phenomena (Goff, 2017). To achieve this, he proposed a conceptual distinction between the primary qualities of objects, which could be described in mathematical terms (such as size, shape, motion, and quantity), and the secondary qualities, which are subjective experiences arising in the observer (such as color, taste, smell, and sound) (Goff, 2017). Galileo reasoned that primary qualities were the real properties of the physical world and could be objectively studied using mathematics and experimentation (Goff, 2017). By contrast, secondary qualities were considered products of the human mind—idiosyncratic and subjective, varying from person to person (Goff, 2017).

In Galileo’s view, these subjective aspects could not be scientifically analysed because they did not exist in the external world in the same way that physical properties did (Goff, 2017). Instead, they were relegated to the domain of the "mental" and treated as irrelevant to the scientific study of nature (Goff, 2017). Galileo’s framework was groundbreaking because it allowed scientists to focus on what could be measured and expressed in mathematical terms, a separation that laid the groundwork for the scientific revolution, enabling tremendous advances in physics, astronomy, and the natural sciences (Goff, 2017). However, Goff highlights that this approach came with a profound limitation: by excluding subjective experience from the realm of scientific inquiry, it left consciousness and the qualitative aspects of reality unaddressed (Goff, 2017). For instance, while science could explain the wavelengths of light that correspond to the color red, it could not explain why or how humans experience the subjective sensation of "redness” (Goff, 2017). Similarly, while science could measure sound waves, it could not account for the inner experience of hearing a melody. These subjective phenomena were effectively removed from the scope of science (Goff, 2017).

Goff argues that Galileo’s decision to exclude subjective experience from scientific inquiry was not an empirical discovery but a methodological choice (Goff, 2017). This exclusion, while useful for developing physics and other sciences, created a conceptual gap that persists to this day - namely, the inability of physical science to explain consciousness (Goff, 2017). In Goff’s view, this is because the tools and methods of science are designed to measure and analyse the objective, quantitative world, but consciousness is inherently qualitative and subjective (Goff, 2017).

The key point of this paragraph is twofold. First, the absence of current empirical data for a theory should not be a reason to dismiss it outright. Many scientific theories began as abstract reasoning and logical deduction, only to later be supported by empirical evidence. Given the simplicity and explanatory power of panpsychism, this theory deserves serious consideration. Second, as Philip Goff argues, the scientific revolution, as initiated by Galileo, intentionally excluded the subjective world from the quantitative realm. This created a fundamental division between science and our understanding of consciousness, effectively leaving consciousness outside the scientific framework. To quantify and empirically verify consciousness, we need a new scientific revolution—one that integrates the study of consciousness into the scientific paradigm.

3.2 Abstract Reasoning & Progress In Science

This argument extends beyond simply providing historical evidence for the role of abstract reasoning in developing theories that were later tested. The more significant point is that it is a fallacy to assume that scientific progress relies solely on experimentation (Goff, 2017). Instead, abstract reasoning is vital for the progress of scientific theories and knowledge (Goff, 2017). Thus, the central idea here is the following: namely, that scientific progress is not solely made through experimentation in a laboratory. Rather, as evidenced by crucial scientific developments, this has involved radically reimagining nature, dreaming up possibilities that nobody had previously entertained (Goff, 2017). Thus, philosophical conjectures are a fundamental aspect of science (Goff, 2017). In fact, as Popper argues, conjectures are merely bold guesses and claims, in which are then later tested and attempted to be falsified (Popper, ; Goff, 2017). One example of how conjectures are important to science is through looking at an example: namely, Einstein’s Theory Of General Relativity. This, as all scientific theories, stemmed from a bold conjecture, in which was achieved via creative thought and abstract reasoning (Goff, 2017). Einstein imagined that gravitational force is the result of curvature in the fabric of spacetime (Goff, 2017). Of course, these novel reimagining’s of nature were later tested via observations and experiments, yet the point remains that many important moments in science involve using creative imagination to make conjectures – bold guesses – as a means of thinking up new ways of understanding the universe (Goff, 2017). When Einstein generated his theory of General Relativity, he wasn’t busy conducting experiments; rather, he was philosophising and thinking abstractly, about how we differently could conceptualise spacetime (Goff, 2017).

The central point being made here is that progress in science is not always made via solely empirical observations (Goff, 2017). In fact, commonly throughout the history of science, using our creative human spirit and imagination to dream up new possibilities is also a vital tool, as evidenced by Darwinism, General Relativity, and an array of other scientific theories (Goff, 2017). If one was merely confined to solely the empirical, this would limit our creative ability, and quash early stage ideas in which have explanatory power, and perhaps can change the way in which we think about consciousness (Goff, 2017).

3.3 Scientific Reasoning:

Another argument can be made to counter claims that panpsychism should be rejected due to a lack of empirical evidence. This argument is that panpsychism follows a well-established scientific reasoning method known as "inference to the best explanation," which is widely used throughout scientific disciplines (Goff, 2017). As Stephen Jay Gould, the Harvard paleontologist and historian of science, argued, the "historical sciences"—such as geology, evolutionary biology, and paleontology—employ methods that differ significantly from those used in the "experimental sciences," like chemistry and physics (Gould, 1986).

Gould asserts that understanding how historical sciences differed from experimental sciences helped to legitimate evolutionary theory in the face of challenges to its scientific rigor by those who questioned its testability (Gould, 1986; Meyer, 2008). According to Gould, historical scientific theories were testable, but not necessarily by experiments under controlled laboratory conditions (Gould, 1986). Instead, he emphasised that historical scientists tested their theories by evaluating their explanatory power (Gould, 1986; Meyer, 2008). The argument here is that, although panpsychism lacks rigorous empirical proof, it should still be regarded as a plausible theory. This is because it adheres to a scientific reasoning method known as inference to the best explanation—a mode of reasoning commonly employed in science, particularly when examining non-repeatable events (Goff, 2017). From this, it can be argued entirely plausibly, that the case for panpsychism is a scientific case, based upon the aforementioned point.

During the 1830s and 1840s, William Whewell, a distinguished scientist and philosopher and the master of Trinity College, Cambridge, published two books about the nature of science that addressed this issue (Meyer, 2008). The publication of Whewell’s work coincided with a surge of interest in natural history in Victorian England and by the 1830s, Charles Lyell had published his seminal Principles of Geology, the first scientific descriptions of dinosaur fossils had been made, and new evolutionary ideas about the history of life were circulating in elite scientific societies (Meyer, 1999). In his volumes History of the Inductive Sciences (1837) and The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840), Whewell distinguished sciences such as physics and chemistry from what he called palaetiology - literally, the “study of past causes” (Whewell, 1840; Whewell, 1837). And he argued that “palaetiological,” or historical, sciences could be distinguished from nonhistorical sciences in three ways (Meyer, 1999; Whewell, 1837).

First, the palaetiological, or historical, sciences have a distinctive objective: to determine ancient conditions or past causes, as opposed to establishing universal laws by which nature generally operates.6 Second, such sciences explain present events (“manifest effects”) by reference to past (causal) events, rather than by reference to general laws (though Whewell acknowledged that laws often play a supporting role in such explanations) (Whewell, 1837; Meyer, 1999). Historical scientists cite the occurrence of an event or series of events in the past as the explanation for some observable phenomenon in the present (Whewell, 1837; Meyer, 1999). For example, a geologist might explain the origin of the Alps as the result of a series of geological events involving the collision of specific tectonic plates, the overthrusting of sedimentary layers, and then the subsequent folding and faulting of those layers (Whewell, 1837; Meyer, 1999). As science historian Jonathan Hodge explains, Whewell realized that historical sciences do not study “forces that are permanent causes of motion, such as gravitational attraction,” but “causes that have worked their effects in temporal succession” (Hodges, 1991). Third, in their attempt to reconstruct “ancient conditions,” Whewell argued that historical scientists also utilized a distinctive mode of reasoning (Whewell, 1837). Using knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships, historical scientists “calculate backwards” and “infer” past conditions and causes from “manifest effects” (Whewell, 1837). As Gould later put it, historical scientists proceed by “inferring history from its results.”12 For example, in order to reconstruct the Cambrian environment, paleontologists such as Gould and Conway Morris made inferences about the past based on present-day fossils and other clues (Gould, 1986). They inferred a past environment and set of conditions as the cause of the evidence they found. Like other historical scientists, they reasoned from clues back to causes (Meyer, 1999).

This type of reasoning is called abductive reasoning or abduction (Meyer, 2014). It was first described by the American philosopher and logician Charles Sanders Peirce, when he noted that, unlike inductive reasoning, in which a universal law or principle is established from repeated observations of the same phenomena, and unlike deductive reasoning, in which a particular fact is deduced by applying a general law to another particular fact or case, abductive reasoning infers unseen facts, events, or causes in the past from clues or facts in the present (Meyer, 2014).

As Peirce noted, the problem with abductive reasoning is that there is often more than one cause that can explain the same effect (Meyer, 2014). To address this problem in geology, the late-nineteenth-century geologist Thomas Chamberlain delineated a method of reasoning he called the “method of multiple working hypotheses” (Meyer, 2014). Geologists and other historical scientists use this method when there is more than one possible cause or hypothesis to explain the same evidence. In such cases, historical scientists carefully weigh the relevant evidence and what they know about various possible causes to determine which best explains it (Meyer, 2014). Contemporary philosophers of science call this the method of “inference to the best explanation.” That is, when trying to explain the origin of an event or structure from the past, historical scientists compare various hypotheses to see which would, if true, best explain it. They then provisionally affirm the hypothesis that best explains the data as the most likely to be true (Meyer, 2014).

Lipton had made a systematic study and defense of a way of reasoning that he called “inference to the best explanation” (IBE) (Lipton, 2017). He argued that this way of reasoning was used commonly in science and ordinary life (Lipton, 2017). For example, he noted, that “faced with tracks in the snow of a peculiar shape, I infer that a person with snowshoes has recently passed this way. There are other possibilities, but I make this inference because it provides the best explanation of what I see” (Lipton, 2017). From the examples he used to illustrate “inference to the best explanation,” it was clear that this method of reasoning was especially useful to scientists who were trying to provide causal explanations of events or circumstantial evidence (Lipton, 2017).

According to Lipton, “beginning with the evidence available to us” we generally “infer what would, if true, best explain that evidence” (Lipton, 2017). This echoed what Peirce had said about how an abductive inference can be strengthened by showing that it alone can explain the evidence (Lipton, 2017; Meyer, 2014). But Lipton made the connection between inference and explanation more explicit and showed how considerations of explanatory power often influenced assessments of competing inferences or hypotheses (Lipton, 2017; Meyer, 2014). Peirce and Gould had convinced me that historical scientists used a distinctive kind of inference - in which past causes are inferred from present effects. Whewell and other philosophers of science showed that historical scientists formulated distinctive types of explanations - ones in which past events or causes are invoked to explain particular facts (Meyer, 2014). Lipton now showed how the two intellectual activities of inferring and explaining are connected.

He showed that scientists often evaluate competing inferences or hypotheses by comparing their explanatory power (Meyer, 2014). That is, assessments of an inference’s explanatory power determine how much stock we place in it (Meyer, 2014). In making this argument, Lipton challenged a popular conception of science, namely, that scientists test their theories only by evaluating the accuracy of the predictions that their theories make about future events (Meyer, 2014).22 Lipton demonstrated that the ability to explain known facts often mattered as much or more than predictive success in the evaluation of an inference or hypothesis (Meyer, 2014).

Clearly, this method of testing scientific ideas is different from that used by experimental scientists, who test their theories by making predictions about what will happen under controlled laboratory conditions (Meyer, 2014). Even so, historical scientists are not the only scientists to use it. Arguably, Watson and Crick used this method to test their ideas about the structure of DNA against competing models (Meyer, 2014). And many scientists - theoretical physicists, biochemists, psychologists, astronomers, pathologists, medical diagnosticians - as well historians, detectives, and thinking people everywhere use this method of reasoning every day to make sense of their experiences (Meyer, 2014). Historical scientists evaluate the strength of competing abductive inferences by comparing their explanatory power (Meyer, 2014). In the best of cases, they will infer a clearly best explanation - one that cites the “only known cause” of the effect or effects in question (Meyer, 2014).

Panpsychism & Scientific Reasoning:

The critical point being emphasized here is that panpsychism adheres to a widely accepted scientific reasoning method known as "inference to the best explanation" (Goff, 2017). This mode of reasoning is not exclusive to experimental sciences but is also integral to historical sciences such as geology, paleontology, and evolutionary biology (Meyer, 2014). By following this method, panpsychism can be regarded as a scientifically plausible theory, even in the absence of direct empirical verification (Goff, 2017).

Inference to the best explanation is a reasoning process in which the hypothesis that best accounts for a given set of observations is provisionally accepted as true (Meyer, 2014). This method is often employed in scenarios where direct experimentation is not possible, such as reconstructing historical events or explaining complex phenomena (Meyer, 2014). The strength of a hypothesis in IBE is determined by its explanatory power—its ability to coherently and parsimoniously account for the evidence at hand (Meyer, 2014).

This approach has been used in numerous scientific disciplines to infer causes from effects, for instance, geologists infer past tectonic activity from present-day rock formations, while evolutionary biologists reconstruct ancestral species from fossil records (Meyer, 2014). These disciplines rely on IBE because they deal with non-repeatable, historical events that cannot be directly observed or recreated in a laboratory (Meyer, 2014). Theories derived through this method are judged not only by their predictive accuracy but also by how well they explain existing evidence (Meyer, 2014).

Panpsychism aligns with inference to the best explanation by addressing the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" - the question of how subjective experience arises from physical processes (Goff, 2017). Existing materialist and dualist frameworks struggle to offer a satisfactory explanation for the emergence of consciousness (Goff, 2017). Materialism often reduces consciousness to physical processes, failing to account for the subjective nature of experience, while dualism posits a fundamental separation between mind and matter that lacks explanatory coherence (Goff, 2017).

In contrast, panpsychism provides a simple and unifying hypothesis: consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, much like mass or charge (Goff, 2017). By positing that consciousness exists in some form at the most basic levels of reality, panpsychism avoids the need to explain how subjective experience emerges from purely non-conscious physical entities (Goff, 2017). It offers a coherent framework that integrates consciousness into the natural world, addressing a critical gap left by other theories (Goff, 2017).

One of the key strengths of panpsychism under the lens of IBE is its explanatory power (Goff, 2017). It does not require the introduction of entirely new ontological categories or entities but instead reinterprets existing ones (Sjöstedt, 2018; Goff, 2017). By treating consciousness as a fundamental property, panpsychism provides a parsimonious explanation that accounts for the presence of subjective experience in a way that aligns with our broader understanding of the universe (Sjöstedt, 2018; Goff, 2017).

Moreover, panpsychism’s use of IBE is consistent with the reasoning methods employed in other scientific fields (Goff, 2017; Sjöstedt, 2018). Just as paleontologists infer the conditions of ancient ecosystems from fossils, proponents of panpsychism infer the fundamental nature of consciousness from its manifestations in humans and other living organisms (Sjöstedt, 2018). This reasoning, while not directly empirical, is firmly rooted in the established practices of scientific inquiry (Sjöstedt, 2018).

The lack of direct empirical evidence does not disqualify panpsychism from being a scientifically credible theory (Sjöstedt, 2018). Historical and theoretical sciences often operate without the benefit of direct observation, relying instead on the strength of their explanatory frameworks (). In the same vein, panpsychism’s alignment with IBE justifies its consideration as a plausible explanation for consciousness (Sjöstedt, 2018).

To dismiss panpsychism outright because it has not been empirically verified would ignore the legitimacy of IBE as a scientific tool (Sjöstedt, 2018). Many groundbreaking theories - such as Darwin's theory of evolution or the hypothesis of tectonic plate movement - began as abductive inferences that gained empirical support over time (). Panpsychism, like these theories, should be evaluated based on its ability to offer a compelling and coherent explanation for the phenomena it seeks to address ().

To summarise the aforementioned points, panpsychism abides by the scientific reasoning method of inference to the best explanation, positioning it as a plausible and legitimate theory despite its lack of direct empirical verification. By leveraging IBE, panpsychism aligns itself with the reasoning methods used in both historical and experimental sciences. Its explanatory power in addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness justifies its serious consideration within the scientific and philosophical communities. Thus, while further empirical investigation is needed, panpsychism remains a robust theoretical framework that deserves a place in the discourse on consciousness.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

4.1 Recap Of Main Thesis

This dissertation has examined the plausibility of panpsychism as a philosophical framework for addressing fundamental questions about the intrinsic nature of matter and the nature of consciousness. By critically analysing panpsychism, it has been argued that panpsychism offers a compelling alternative for understanding consciousness as an intrinsic feature of reality. Through an exploration of the intrinsic nature problem and the hard problem of consciousness, this work demonstrated how panpsychism successfully prevails as an adequate theory of consciousness. Further, the dissertation addressed significant criticisms, such as the lack of empirical evidence and the combination problem, highlighting how panpsychism provides a robust and coherent account of consciousness that overcomes these counter arguments.

This dissertation highlighted two central arguments in favour of panpsychism, demonstrating its potential to address key philosophical challenges.

First, the Intrinsic Nature Problem was examined, emphasising the limitations of physics in describing the intrinsic properties of matter. While physics excels at explaining the behavior and interactions of matter, it remains silent on what matter truly is. Panpsychism fills this explanatory gap by proposing that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter insofar as the sole window we have into the nature of intrinsic matter is through our brains – in which we experience consciousness.

Second, the Hard Problem of Consciousness was addressed, focusing on the difficulty of explaining how subjective experience arises from physical processes. Panpsychism provides a solution by positing that complex forms of consciousness, like those observed in humans, emerge from simpler conscious properties inherent in the basic constituents of matter. By avoiding the pitfalls of dualism and physicalism, panpsychism presents a coherent and elegant approach to understanding consciousness, offering a viable alternative to existing frameworks.

4.2 Summary of Key Arguments

This dissertation also addressed two key criticisms of panpsychism, demonstrating that these challenges, while significant, do not undermine the plausibility of the theory.

The first criticism concerns the lack of empirical evidence for panpsychism’s claims that consciousness is a fundamental property of all matter. While this absence of direct evidence is often cited as a weakness, it does not invalidate the theory. Historically, many scientific breakthroughs - such as the atomic theory and Darwinian evolution - began as speculative frameworks based on abstract reasoning rather than immediate empirical validation. Similarly, panpsychism’s explanatory coherence – through inference to the best explanation – aligns with a scientific mode of reasoning, and thus must be treated as a plausible theory of consciousness.

The second criticism, known as the Combination Problem, questions how simple conscious entities, such as fundamental particles, combine to form the complex and unified consciousness observed in living beings. While this is a significant challenge for panpsychism, it reflects a broader difficulty in explaining emergent complexity across various scientific fields, including biology and physics. This issue is not unique to panpsychism but rather highlights a general gap in our understanding of how simpler components give rise to more intricate systems – such as biologically specified information. As such, the combination problem does not refute panpsychism but instead points to a broader limit of our overall knowledge pertaining to how elementary particles interact to form complex matter.

4.3 Implications Of Findings

The findings of this dissertation carry significant implications across theoretical, ethical, and scientific domains, suggesting that panpsychism has the potential to reshape our understanding of consciousness and reality.

Theoretically, panpsychism offers a groundbreaking framework by bridging the gap between subjective experience and physical science. By positing that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, it challenges the traditional materialist paradigm and provides a unified perspective that integrates mental and physical phenomena. This perspective has the potential to revolutionise our understanding of reality, offering a more holistic view that encompasses both the external behaviors of matter and its intrinsic nature.

Ethically, the implications of panpsychism are profound. If consciousness is intrinsic to all matter, this view calls for a reassessment of how we perceive and treat non-human entities, the environment, and even artificial intelligence. Such a perspective fosters a sense of interconnectedness, encouraging ethical considerations that extend beyond human-centric frameworks to include all forms of existence, potentially reshaping attitudes toward environmental conservation and the development of technology.

Scientifically, the findings underscore the need for new methodologies and paradigms to study consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality. Current scientific approaches, rooted in materialism, may be insufficient to fully explore and understand the implications of panpsychism. This calls for interdisciplinary research that combines insights from philosophy, neuroscience, and physics to develop innovative tools and frameworks capable of capturing the rich complexity of consciousness. These implications highlight the transformative potential of panpsychism, both as a philosophical theory and as a guide for future scientific inquiry.

4.4 Acknowledgment Of Limitations

Despite its explanatory power and potential, there are still broader issues that need to be addressed; firstly, whilst this dissertation has asserted that it is unjust to dispute the plausibility of panpsychism based upon the current lack of significant evidence, vitally the lack of empirical evidence for panpsychism highlights the current limitations of scientific methodologies in addressing questions about consciousness. These gaps underscore the need for continued interdisciplinary research that integrates insights from philosophy, neuroscience, and physics to refine the theory and address its shortcomings. Acknowledging these limitations does not diminish the plausibility of panpsychism but rather emphasizes the ongoing need for theoretical and empirical innovation to advance our understanding of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world.

4.5 Directions For Future Research

This dissertation highlights several promising directions for future research that could deepen our understanding of panpsychism and its implications.

Firstly, theoretical development is essential to address unresolved challenges, particularly in understanding how elementary particles combine to form complex structures. While it has been asserted that the combination argument is not a weakness for panpsychism insofar as it reflects a broader limitation as to our knowledge of how elementary particles combine to form complex structures – for instance, functionally biologically specified information – further work is required to understand this problem of combination in order to give a more unified picture of reality and by extension consciousness. This effort could involve drawing on insights from fields like information theory, emergent systems, and computational modelling to explore the mechanisms of fundamental particles combination and interaction.

Second, there is significant potential in pursuing empirical possibilities to test or measure consciousness at the micro-level. While panpsychism currently lacks direct empirical validation, future advances in neuroscience, quantum physics, or other technologies might enable us to investigate signs of consciousness in simpler systems or fundamental particles. For example, identifying measurable correlates of consciousness at the atomic or subatomic level could provide valuable evidence to support panpsychist claims. These efforts may require developing entirely new tools and experimental methods capable of detecting and interpreting consciousness beyond the biological realm.

Finally, cross-disciplinary approaches will be critical for advancing the study of panpsychism. Collaboration between philosophy, neuroscience, physics, and computer science can offer a more comprehensive understanding of consciousness by integrating theoretical and empirical insights. Philosophers can contribute conceptual clarity and frameworks, while scientists can provide methodologies and data to test these ideas. For instance, interdisciplinary research on artificial intelligence and integrated information theory could illuminate parallels between consciousness in biological systems and its potential presence in non-biological entities.

In sum, future research must engage both theoretical and empirical dimensions, leveraging cross-disciplinary collaboration to address the complex questions surrounding panpsychism. These efforts not only have the potential to validate or refine panpsychism but also to contribute significantly to broader inquiries into the nature of consciousness and the fabric of reality itself.

4.6 Final Reflection

Panpsychism challenges us to reconsider some of our most deeply held assumptions about the nature of reality. By proposing that consciousness is an intrinsic and fundamental aspect of matter, it offers a transformative framework that bridges the gap between subjective experience and the physical world. This perspective not only unifies mental and physical phenomena but also pushes the boundaries of both philosophical and scientific inquiry, encouraging a more holistic understanding of the cosmos.

While the plausibility of panpsychism remains an open question, this dissertation has demonstrated its explanatory power and potential to address enduring problems, such as the intrinsic nature problem and the hard problem of consciousness. In doing so, it highlights the theory’s capacity to reshape the discourse on consciousness, challenging the dominance of materialist paradigms and inviting new ways of thinking about existence.

Ultimately, panpsychism invites us to explore the universe with a sense of wonder and curiosity, recognising that the answers to fundamental questions about consciousness may lie not in dismissing unconventional ideas but in embracing the possibility that reality is far richer and more interconnected than we have traditionally imagined. This work underscores the importance of continued exploration and interdisciplinary dialogue in uncovering the mysteries of consciousness and the true nature of existence.

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